How much warning do you need as a software provider about your code being poorly written? And why do you write code like this? Sorry, but I can't fault any provider that was hit by this attack, and all I can say is that I am sorry that some of you guys had to suffer because of this:
<?php
if ($_POST['delete']) {
$xc = $db -> query('SELECT * FROM centralbackup WHERE id = \'' . $_POST['deleteid'] . '\'', true);
#[...]
if ($xc[status] == 'failed') {
exec('php /usr/local/solusvm/system/bus.php -- --comm=deletebackup --serverid=' . $xc['bserver'] . ' --nodeid=' . $vdata['nodeid'] . ' --vserverid=' . $vdata['vserverid'] . ' --filename=' . $xc['filename']);
#[...]
}
}
?>
Hasn't anyone decrypted the source? Couldn't they then run a search for dumb execs?
@D. Strout There's been a decoded version floating around the web for a while now, I guess that's how the vulnerability was found and exploited in the first place. Pretty lame, but it is what it is.
Guys, here is something simple that you should do immediately: restrict access to the admin path. Restrict it by IP, with a password, or ideally both. @Kujoe had some good advice as well on how to secure SolusVM.
Kind regards,
Marc
